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Why We Don’t Really Know What “Statistical Significance” Means:
A Major Educational Failure
ABSTRACT
The Neyman–Pearson theory of hypothesis testing, with the Type I error rate, α, as the
significance level, is widely regarded as statistical testing orthodoxy. Fisher’s model of
significance testing, where the evidential p value denotes the level of significance, nevertheless
dominates statistical testing practice. This paradox has occurred because these two incompatible
theories of classical statistical testing have been anonymously mixed together, creating the false
impression of a single, coherent model of statistical inference. We show that this hybrid
approach to testing, with its misleading p < α statistical significance criterion, is common in
marketing research textbooks, as well as in a large random sample of papers from twelve
marketing journals. That is, researchers attempt the impossible by simultaneously interpreting
the p value as a Type I error rate and as a measure of evidence against the null hypothesis. The
upshot is that many investigators do not know what our most cherished, and ubiquitous, research
desideratum—“statistical significance”—really means. This, in turn, signals an educational
failure of the first order. We suggest that tests of statistical significance, whether p’s or α’s, be
downplayed in statistics and marketing research courses. Classroom instruction should focus
instead on teaching students to emphasize the use of confidence intervals around point estimates
in individual studies, and the criterion of overlapping confidence intervals when one has
estimates from similar studies.
Keywords: α levels; p values; p < α criterion; Fisher; Neyman–Pearson; (overlapping)
confidence intervals

For many scholars the significance test is the glue that binds together the entire research
process. The test of statistical significance largely dictates how we formulate hypotheses;
design questionnaires; organize experiments; and analyze, report, and summarize results. It is
viewed not only as our chief vehicle for making statistical inferences, but for drawing
scientific inferences, too. That is, the test of significance is regarded as playing an important
epistemological role. As Lindsay (1995) notes with dismay, computing such a test has come
to be equated with scientific rigor, and is considered the touchstone for establishing
knowledge. Gigerenzer et al. (1989, p. 108) share Lindsay’s sentiments: “What is most
remarkable is the confidence within each social-science discipline that the standards of
scientific demonstration have now been objectively and universally defined.” This test, in
short, is no mere statistical “technique,” but instead is seen to lie at the heart of the way in
which we conceptualize and conduct research. Or as Cicchetti (1998, p. 293) tersely put it,
the focus on significance testing often is considered “…as an end, in and of itself.”
To see the validity of the above account it is only necessary to look to our own
experiences as graduate students and educators. We were (almost) all taught that the
significance testing paradigm is the way to do sound research. Indeed, most of us trained in
this paradigm have no idea of how research was carried out prior to its rise to dominance, and
would be hard-pressed to visualize what future research would look like if the paradigm
collapsed.
Others (e.g., Sawyer and Peter 1983) have noted that marketing researchers misinterpret
the outcomes of significance tests. For example, such tests are erroneously believed to
indicate the probability that (1) the results occurred because of chance, (2) the results will
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replicate, (3) the alternative hypothesis is true, (4) the results will generalize, and (5) the
results are substantively significant.
Our paper is not concerned with these misinterpretations, serious as they are. Rather, we
maintain that misconceptions among researchers regarding statistical significance tests are far
deeper than earlier works suggest. Specifically, we argue that researchers are confused over
the very meaning of “statistical significance” itself. This inability to comprehend the exact
nature of the criterion we so earnestly, and routinely, seek above all others to adjudicate
knowledge claims underscores that something is seriously wrong in statistics and marketing
research education. The present paper explains, and demonstrates the consequences of, a
major educational breakdown—the failure to correctly teach generations of students precisely
what “statistical significance” means. In doing so, we show that significance testing is a
mechanistic ritual so thoroughly misunderstood as to be largely bereft of meaning. And
worse, this emphasis on significance testing in the classroom and textbooks has diverted
attention from superior data analysis strategies designed to promote cumulative knowledge
growth. The end result is that our literature is comprised mainly of uncorroborated, one-shot
studies whose value is questionable for academics and practitioners alike.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe how the wholesale confusion over
the meaning of statistical significance has been caused by mixing together in statistics and
methodology textbooks two different classical statistical testing models—Fisher’s and
Neyman–Pearson’s. This necessitates a brief outline of some key differences between them,
which, in turn, leads to a discussion of the problematical p < α criterion as a measure of
statistical significance. Second, we indicate how the authors of marketing research textbooks
often mistakenly define and interpret p values and α levels, treat them interchangeably,
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invoke the p < α yardstick, and thereby obscure the meaning of statistical significance. Third,
we show via a random sample of articles from twelve marketing journals how these mistakes
carry over into the empirical literature. Fourth, we offer some advice regarding data analysis.
This includes a short section for those intent on using significance tests. Better yet, however,
we suggest replacing such tests with estimates of sample statistics, effect sizes, and their
confidence intervals in single studies. We also recommend the criterion of overlapping
confidence intervals for determining the equivalence (or otherwise) of estimates across
similar studies.
WHY THE CONFUSION OVER THE MEANING OF “STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE”?
Some authors (e.g., Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Vitouch 2004; Goodman 1993; Hubbard and
Bayari 2003; Royall 1997) allege that the principal reason why researchers cannot accurately
define what is meant by “statistical significance” is because many statistics and methodology
textbooks are similarly confused over the exact meaning of this concept. This is because these
texts inadvertently mix together two incompatible measures of “statistical significance” into an
anonymous hybrid, thereby creating the illusion of a single, harmonious theory of statistical
inference. One is Fisher’s evidential p value and the other is the Type I error rate, α, of the
Neyman–Pearson (N–P) school. The distinction between evidence (p’s) and errors (α’s) is not a
matter of splitting hairs. As Hubbard and Bayarri (2003) noted it reflects the pronounced
differences between Fisher’s views on significance testing and inductive inference, and N–P
ideas on hypothesis testing and inductive behavior. But because statistics and methodology
textbooks tend to combine elements from both schools of thought, something that neither Fisher
nor N–P would have agreed to, there is confusion over what “statistically significant at the .05
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[or other] level” really means. We briefly discuss some key differences between the Fisherian
and N–P camps below.
Fisher’s Significance Testing and Neyman–Pearson’s Hypothesis Testing
Paradigms1
The p value from Fisher’s significance testing procedure measures the probability of
encountering an outcome (x) of this magnitude (or larger) conditional on a true null hypothesis
of no effect or relationship, or Pr (x | H0). Thus, a p value is a measure of inductive evidence
against H0, and the smaller the value, the greater the evidence. Fisher saw statistics as playing a
vital part in inductive inference, drawing conclusions from the particular to the general, from
samples to populations. He held that knowledge is created via inductive inference, and for him
the evidential p value had an important role in this process.
The N–P theory of hypothesis testing, which began assuming the mantle of statistical
orthodoxy over Fisher’s significance testing paradigm after World War II (Royall 1997), is quite
different from the latter. It is not a theory of statistical inference at all. N–P summarily dismissed
the concept of inductive inference, and focused instead on statistical testing as a mechanism for
making decisions and guiding behavior. Whereas Fisher specified only the null hypothesis (H0),
N–P introduced two hypotheses, the null and the alternative (HA), and their approach invites a
decision between two distinct courses of action, accepting H0 or rejecting it in favor of HA.
Mistakes occur when choosing between accepting H0 or HA. According to N–P, the significance
level, or Type I error, α, is the false rejection of H0, while a Type II error, β, is the false
acceptance of H0. N–P statistical testing is aimed at error minimization, and is not concerned
with gathering evidence. Furthermore, this error minimization is of a long-run variety; unlike
Fisher’s approach, N–P theory does not apply to an individual study. Consider, finally, that
Fisher’s evidential p value is a data-dependent random variable. This is in contrast to N-P’s α,
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which must be fixed in advance of gathering the data so as to constrain the probability of a
Type I error to some agreed-upon value.
The Hybrid Testing Paradigm
Fisher (1955, p. 74) complained, justifiably, that his significance test had become
“assimilated” into the N–P hypothesis testing framework. Because of this assimilation, most
empirical work in marketing and the social sciences, echoing what is presented in the textbooks,
is carried out roughly as follows: The investigator specifies the null (H0) and alternative (HA)
hypotheses, the Type I error rate/significance level, α, and (supposedly) calculates the power of
the test (e.g., z). These steps are congruent with N–P orthodoxy. Next, the test statistic is
computed, and in an effort to have one’s cake and eat it too, a p value is determined. Statistical
significance is then established by using the problematical p < α criterion; if p < α, a result is
deemed statistically significant, if p > α, it is not.
The end result of this assimilation of Fisher’s and N–P’s methods is that, despite being
completely different entities with completely different interpretations, the p value is now
associated in researchers’ minds with the Type I error rate, α. And because both concepts are tail
area probabilities, the p value is erroneously interpreted as a frequency-based “observed” Type I
error rate, and at the same time as an incorrect (i.e., p < α) measure of evidence against H0
(Goodman 1993; Hubbard and Bayarri 2003).
There are problems with the interpretation of the p < α criterion. For example, when
formulated as “reject H0 when p < α, accept it otherwise,” only the N–P claim of 100α% false
rejections of the null with ongoing sampling is valid. That is, the specific value of p itself is
irrelevant and should not be reported. In the N–P decision model the researcher can only say
whether or not a result fell in the rejection region, but not where it fell, as might be shown by a
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p value. So, if α is fixed at the .05 level before the study is conducted, and the researcher gets,
after the fact, a p value of, say, .0023, this exact value cannot be reported in an N–P hypothesis
test. As Goodman (1993) points out, this is because α is the probability of a set of potential
outcomes that may fall anywhere in the tail area of the distribution under the null hypothesis, and
we cannot know ahead of time which of these particular outcomes will occur. This is not the
same as the tail area for the p value, which is known only after the outcome is observed.
For the same reasons it is not admissible to report what Goodman (1993, p. 489) calls
“roving alphas,” i.e., p values that take on a limited number of categories of Type I error rates,
e.g., p < .05, p < .01; p < .001, etc. As discussed, a Type I error rate, α, must be fixed before the
data are collected, and any attempt to later reinterpret values like p < .05, p < .01, etc. as variable
Type I error rates applicable to different parts of any given study is not allowed. Further
complicating matters, these variable Type I error “p” values are also interpreted in an evidential
fashion when p < α, e.g., where p < .05 is called “significant,” p < .01 is “highly significant,”
p < .001 is “extremely significant,” and so on. Because of the confusion created among
researchers by the p < α rule of thumb, Hubbard and Bayarri (2003) called for its abolition in
textbooks and journal articles.
CONFUSION OVER “STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE” IN MARKETING RESEARCH
TEXTBOOKS
We examined a convenience sample of fourteen marketing research textbooks to determine
whether their methodological leanings were N–P, Fisherian, or some combination thereof. In no
case did these authors explicitly acknowledge the intellectual heritage underlying their
discussions of statistical testing. The anonymous treatment of such testing was the norm.
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Therefore, in Table 1 we assigned these texts to one of five categories on an N–P-to-Fisherian
continuum of statistical testing.
____________________
Insert Table 1 about here
____________________
The text by Kinnear and Taylor (1991) presents a strictly N–P approach. They discuss Type I
and II errors, the power of a test, and refer to α as the significance level. Moreover, p values are
absent in their account. Nevertheless, they cross over to Fisher’s camp when they speak of
“evidence,” something that is denied in N–P theory.
Hair, Bush, and Ortinau (2003), Tull and Hawkins (1993), and Zikmund (1997) also employ
an N–P approach, with discussions covering Type I and II errors, the power of a test, and α as
the significance level. But in all three cases the authors unwittingly mix N–P and Fisherian
methods when p values, without explaining their appearance and meaning, infiltrate the
empirical examples.
Six of the fourteen texts—Aaker, Kumar, and Day (2001), Churchill and Iacobucci (2002),
Cooper and Schindler (2006), Malhotra (2004), McDaniel and Gates (2002), and Parasuraman,
Grewal, and Krishnan (2004)—present N–P testing methods. But they also blend ideas from both
camps when discussing, to varying extents, p values. Malhotra (2004), and Cooper and Schindler
(2006), hedge their bets by offering the researcher the choice of either of the (unstated) Fisherian
or N–P options. And they, too, recommend the p < α rule of thumb.
McDaniel and Gates (2002, p. 537) subscribe to the p < α criterion in statistical testing, and
also incorrectly define the p value as “The exact probability of getting a computed test statistic
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that was largely due to chance.” Parasuraman et al. (2004), on the other hand, in common with
Cooper and Schindler (2006), misinterpret the p value as a Type I error rate.
Textbooks by Burns and Bush (2000), Crask, Fox, and Stout (1995), and Lehmann, Gupta,
and Steckel (1998) are basically non-committal in terms of their Fisherian versus N–P
allegiances. Both Burns and Bush (2000) and Crask et al. (1995), for example, contain no
discussions of α as the significance level, Type I and II errors, or the power of a test. Burns and
Bush (2000) nevertheless champion the misleading p < α statistical testing criterion. And Crask
et al. (1995) reveal something of a preference for the N–P camp when discussing statistical
testing at the 5% and 10% “risk levels.” Lehmann et al. (1998) bow in the direction of N–P. For
example, they briefly address Type I and II errors, but do not speak to the power of a test or refer
to α (or p values) as the significance level. They simply talk of results being “statistically
significant” at the .05 or .01 levels.
Finally, Sudman and Blair’s (1998) text is mostly Fisherian in nature. There is a complete
absence of N–P terminology. Like Lehmann et al. (1998), they are neutral in their discussion of
the .05 and .01 “significance levels,” invoking neither p’s nor α’s. Sudman and Blair (1998) do,
however, use (unexplained) p values in their numerical examples.
It is clear from the above that marketing research textbooks typically contain an anonymous
mixture of competing Fisherian and N–P ideas about statistical testing, as well as some of the
problems that inevitably accompany this. Most of them emphasize formal N–P theory, but this
unintentionally erodes when p values and α levels are treated interchangeably without offering
any explanation as to their very different origins and interpretations. As shown in the following
section, this same hybrid of Fisherian and N–P testing is seen in leading marketing journals.
Only this time, it is the former’s influence that is dominant.
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CONFUSION OVER “STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE” IN MARKETING JOURNALS
We investigated how the results of statistical tests are reported in marketing journals. More
specifically, two randomly selected issues of each of twelve marketing journals—the European
Journal of Marketing (EJM, 1971), International Journal of Market Research (IJMR, 1966),
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science (JAMS, 1973), Journal of Advertising Research
(JAR, 1960), Journal of Consumer Research (JCR, 1974), Journal of Macromarketing (JMM,
1981), Journal of Marketing (JM, 1936), Journal of Marketing Education (JME, 1979), Journal
of Marketing Research (JMR, 1964), Journal of Retailing (JR, 1960), Marketing Letters (ML,
1990), and Marketing Science (MS, 1982)—were analyzed for every year indicated in the
parentheses through 2002 in order to determine the number of empirical articles and notes
published therein.2 This procedure yielded a sample of 4,344 empirical papers. The latter were
then inspected to see whether statistical tests had been employed in the data analysis. It was
discovered that 3,021 of the 4,344 empirical works, or 69.5%, did so. Moreover, the incidence of
empirical papers using statistical significance testing has grown steadily over time. Thus, for
example, 37.4% of empirical papers used significance tests during 1960–1969, a number
increasing monotonically for 1970–1979 (65.5%), 1980–1989 (76.6%), 1990–1999 (80.4%), and
2000–2002 (85.3%).
Although the evidential p value from a significance test violates the orthodox N–P model, the
last line of Table 2 shows that p values are commonplace in marketing’s empirical literature.
Conversely, α levels are in short supply.
Of the 3,021 papers using statistical tests, fully 1,660, or 54.9%, employed “roving alphas,”
i.e., a discrete, graduated number of p values interpreted variously as Type I error rates and/or
measures of evidence against H0, usually p < .05, p < .01, p < .001, etc. In other words, these
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p values are sometimes viewed as an “observed” Type I error rate meaning that they are not preassigned, or fixed, error levels as would be dictated by N–P theory. Instead, these “error rates”
are determined solely by the data. Further clouding the issue, these same p values will be
interpreted simultaneously in a quasi-evidential manner as a basis for rejecting H0 if p < α. In
short, these “roving alphas” can assume a number of incorrect and contradictory interpretations.
We also plead guilty to the charge of having abused roving alphas in this way.
A further 254 (8.4%) chose to report “exact” p values, while an additional 367 (12.1%) opted
to present various combinations of exact p’s with either “roving alphas” or fixed p values.
Conservatively, therefore, 2,281, or 75.5%, of empirical articles in a sample of marketing
journals report the results of statistical tests in a manner that is incompatible with N–P doctrine.
Another 79 (2.6%) studies were not sufficiently clear about the disposition of a finding (beyond
statements such as “this result was statistically significant at conventional levels”) in their
accounts.
This leaves 661 (21.9%) studies as eligible for the reporting of “fixed” level α values in the
fashion intended by N–P. Unfortunately, 246 of these 661 studies reported “fixed p” rather than
fixed α levels. After subtracting this group, only 415 (13.7%) studies remain eligible. Of these
415, some 346 simply refer to their published results as being “significant” at the .05, .01 levels,
etc. No information about p values or α levels is provided. Finally, only 69 of 3,021 empirical
papers using statistical tests, or 2.3%, explicitly used α levels.
_____________________
Insert Table 2 about here
_____________________
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This meshing of p’s and α’s is not only wrong from a conceptual and methodological
perspective, but also has a pronounced impact on the results of statistical tests. While α can
indeed be fixed at some prespecified (e.g., .05) level, this same constraint does not apply to
p values. This can be seen by accessing an applet at www.stat.duke.edu/~berger which simulates
the frequentist performance of p values. More specifically, the applet simulates via ongoing
normal testing the proportion of times that the null hypothesis is true for a given p value. Thus, if
the researcher wishes to see the proportion of times H0 is true for p = .05, a small range such as
.049 to .050 must be chosen. The simulation then carries out a long series of tests, and calculates
how often the null is true and false whenever the p value is in the .049 to .050 range. The
researcher must also state the proportion of null hypotheses chosen to be true in the sequence of
simulated tests. For instance, suppose we conduct a long series of tests examining the
responsiveness of sales revenues to varying advertising outlays. Suppose, further, we specify that
H0 is true for one-half of these advertising outlays; then of all the tests yielding a p value of
around .05, the final percentage of true nulls is at least 22% and as high as 50%. The
implications for applied research are chilling: 22% to 50% of the times we see a p value of .05
reported in the literature, it is in fact coming from the null hypothesis of no effect.
We see only marginal value in significance testing, no matter the variety. However, for those
who insist on using statistical testing we offer the following advice. At a minimum, researchers
should make a conscious effort to determine whether their concerns are with controlling errors or
collecting evidence. If the former, as in quality control experiments, then the N–P approach is
best for guiding behavior. But this should be accompanied by a serious attempt to calculate the
costs associated with committing Type I and II errors, rather than the habitual adoption of
α = .05 and the absence of a power analysis to detect effect sizes in the population. Moreover, if
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this option is chosen, it is imperative that the α level be fixed before the study begins, and that
the reporting of nonsensical “roving alphas” ceases. Finally, under no circumstances invoke the
p < α criterion of statistical significance.

If the goal of the research is evidential in nature (which will be most of the time), then the
use of Fisher’s p value is appropriate. Whenever possible, report exact p values to once again
avoid the “roving alphas” dilemma. Further, do not employ the p < α significance criterion; a
p value is not an error probability. But a better strategy for data analysis is to focus on
estimation, not testing. This is discussed below.
(OVERLAPPING) CONFIDENCE INTERVALS—AN ALTERNATIVE TO
“STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE”
Rather than relying on significance testing, researchers should instead report the results of
sample statistics, effect sizes, and their confidence intervals (CIs). CIs are far more informative
than a yes-no significance test. First, they emphasize the importance of estimation over testing.
Scientific progress almost always depends on arriving at credible estimates of the magnitude of
effect sizes; and a CI yields a range of estimates deemed likely for the population. Second, the
width of the CI provides a measure of the reliability or precision of the estimate. Third, CIs make
it far easier to determine whether a finding has any substantive, as opposed to statistical,
significance. This is because they are couched in the same metric as the estimate itself, and thus
the plausibility of the values in the interval are easy to interpret within the context of the
problem. Fourth, unlike statistical significance tests which are vulnerable to Type I error
proliferation, CIs hold the true error rate (.05, .01, etc.) to the chosen level (Schmidt 1996). Fifth,
if need be, a CI can be used as a significance test. For example, a 95% CI that does not include
the null value (usually zero) is equivalent to rejecting the hypothesis at the .05 level.
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Finally, and of critical importance, the use of CIs promotes cumulative knowledge
development by obligating researchers to think meta-analytically about estimation, replication,
and comparing intervals across studies (Thompson 2002). It allows for the possibility of unifying
a seemingly fragmented literature. Unfortunately, the preoccupation with obtaining statistically
significant results frustrates cumulative knowledge development. This is because, Ottenbacher
(1996) points out, a “successful” replication is typically defined as a null hypothesis that was
rejected in the original investigation is again rejected (in the same direction) in a follow-up
study. But this is too stringent a benchmark. Rather than using statistical significance to denote a
successful replication, we advocate the criterion of overlapping CIs around point estimates
across similar studies. Overlapping CIs indicate credible estimates of the same population
parameter.
To illustrate the superiority of this strategy for developing cumulative knowledge, we
selected real correlational data present in Schmidt (1996) on personnel selection. But we
renamed the variables to suit an educational scenario. Suppose there are four articles, each in this
case with sample size n = 68, dealing with the correlation between the number of hours spent
studying and GPAs. The correlation coefficients, r’s, and 95% CIs for these four articles are as
follows: (1) r = 0.39 (CI = 0.19 to 0.59); (2) r = 0.29 (CI = 0.07 to 0.51); (3) r = 0.14 (CI = –0.09
to 0.37), and (4) r = 0.11 (CI = –0.13 to 0.35). The first two studies are significant at p < .05,
while the last two are not.
When using significance testing and “nose counting” as evaluative criteria, a traditional
review of this literature would conclude that it is made up of contradictory results; half the
investigations support the hypothesis of a relationship between the number of hours studying and
GPAs, and half do not. But this conclusion would be incorrect. In fact, all four articles
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corroborate one another because they all show a positive relationship between study-hours and
GPAs, even though two of them are not significant. This is revealed by the fact that their CIs all
overlap, even for the highest and lowest correlations. This literature is consistent, not
contradictory. Use of overlapping CIs fosters cumulative knowledge growth, while the emphasis
on significance testing thwarts it.
But to be able to perform this kind of analysis requires that the articles are indeed dealing
with “similar” studies. And this is why Hubbard and Armstrong (1994) stress the crucial need for
systematic replication with extension research programs aimed at discovering empirical
generalizations, or the missing bedrock of marketing knowledge that Leone and Schultz (1980)
called for.
Another worrisome problem, given the publication bias against insignificant results (Hubbard
and Armstrong 1992), is that reported estimates of the effect size in the population will be
inflated. For example, if the two “negative” results papers above never see print, then the average
effect size will be given as r = 0.34, when it is only r = 0.23.
CONCLUSIONS
The mixing of measures of evidence (p’s) with measures of error (α’s) is commonplace in
classrooms, textbooks, and scholarly journals. The upshot is that many researchers have an
unsure grasp of what “statistical significance” really means. Is it captured by p values, α levels,
the p < α criterion, or any and all of the above? Such confusion makes ritualistic significance
testing largely vacuous. Gigerenzer et al. (2004, p. 395) said as much with respect to psychology
research: “The collective illusions about the meaning of a significant result are embarrassing to
our profession.” Yet a similar environment prevails in marketing.
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While this situation is regrettable, it is also understandable. It was caused by the anonymous
blending of two schools of classical statistical testing, each with incompatible measures of
statistical significance, into what textbooks continue to misrepresent as a single, uncontroversial
theory of statistical inference.
The solution to this problem necessitates changes in graduate classroom instruction, and the
textbooks that sustain it. With this in mind, we offer two recommendations. First, if statistical
significance testing is to be featured in the curriculum, the differences between the Fisher and
N-P paradigms require explanation. Students need to be better informed about exactly what is
meant by “statistical significance.” All too often we rely on computer printouts reporting a
thicket of significance levels without fully understanding the reasoning behind them. Second,
and better yet, we should be taught to provide confidence intervals around sample statistics and
effect sizes, and examine whether the relevant CIs overlap across similar studies in systematic
replication with extension research programs. This would facilitate meta-analyses aimed at
building a cumulative knowledge base in marketing. At present, our empirical literature is made
up of mostly unverified, one-shot studies, fueled by an emphasis on significance testing. It is past
time for a serious overhaul in statistics and marketing research education.
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TABLE 1
STATISTICAL TESTING IN MARKETING RESEARCH TEXTBOOKS: UNSTATED METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS
Strictly Neyman–Pearson
Approach (No Discussion of
p Values)

Neyman–Pearson Approach
(No Discussion of p Values—
But They Appear in Examples)

These texts discuss α as the
significance level, Type I and
II errors, the power of a test,
etc.

These texts discuss α as the
significance level, Type I and
II errors, the power of a test,
etc. In addition, they introduce
p values/significance
probabilities in numerical
examples, but without
explaining them.

Example:
Kinnear/Taylor (1991)
But they switch to Fisher
when talking of the
“evidence” in a study.
Neyman–Pearson theory
denies evidential
interpretations; it prescribes
only behaviors.

Examples:
Hair/Bush/Ortinau (2003)
Tull/Hawkins (1993)

Neyman–Pearson Approach (But Also Discuss
p Values)
These texts discuss α as the significance level,
Type I and II errors, the power of a test, etc. In
addition, some texts attempt an explanation of
p values.
Examples:
Aaker/Kumar/Day (2001)
Only text that tries to explain differences
between p’s and α’s. Does not acknowledge the
incompatibility of p’s and α’s. Essentially
invokes the p < α criterion in statistical testing.
Churchill/Iacobucci (2002)
Does not distinguish between p’s and α’s.

Zikmund (1997)
Cooper/Schindler (2006)
Invokes the p < α criterion in statistical testing.
Incorrectly defines p value as a Type I error rate.
Malhotra (2004)
Advocates use of both p’s and α’s. Invokes the
p < α criterion in statistical testing.
McDaniel/Gates (2002)
Incorrectly defines p value. Invokes the p < α
criterion in statistical testing.
Parasuraman/Grewal/Krishnan (2004)
Incorrectly defines p value as a Type I error rate.

Nominally Neyman–Pearson
Approach

Basically Fisherian p Value
Approach

These texts briefly allude to
Neyman–Pearson orthodoxy.

These texts avoid all reference
to Neyman–Pearson theory.
They do not discuss Type I and
II errors, the power of a test, or
α as the significance level.

Examples:
Burns/Bush (2000)
Does not discuss Type I and
II errors, the power of a test,
or α levels. Nevertheless,
invokes the p < α criterion in
statistical testing.
Crask/Fox/Stout (1995)
Does not discuss Type I and
II errors, the power of a test,
and either α levels or
p values as the significance
level. But does discuss
testing at the 5% and 10%
“risk levels.”
Lehmann/Gupta/Steckel
(1998)
Briefly mentions Type I and
II errors. Does not discuss
the power of a test, α levels,
or p values. Talks instead of
“statistically significant” at
the .05, .01, etc. levels.

Examples:
Sudman/Blair (1998)
Falsely equates hypothesis tests
with significance tests.
Basically adopts the Fisherian
significance testing approach, p
(x | H0), without invoking
p values. Refers only to .05,
.01, etc. significance levels. Do
use p values in numerical
examples, but without
explaining them.

TABLE 2
THE REPORTING OF RESULTS OF STATISTICAL TESTS

“Roving
Alphas”(R)
Journal

No.

Exact p Values
(Ep)

Combination of Ep’s
With Fixed p Values
and
“Roving Alphas”

“Fixed” Level Values
P’s

α ’s

“Significant”

Unspecified

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

EJM

54

46.2

12

10.3

21

17.9

10

8.5

14

12.0

2

1.7

4

3.4

IJMR

40

35.7

25

22.3

8

7.1

13

11.6

18

16.1

2

1.8

6

5.4

JAMS

186

54.7

28

8.2

53

15.6

29

8.5

32

9.4

9

2.6

3

0.9

JAR

120

43.0

40

14.3

22

7.9

36

12.9

53

19.0

2

0.7

6

2.2

JCR

327

77.3

6

1.4

49

11.6

17

4.0

13

3.1

3

0.7

8

1.9

JM

168

47.7

38

10.8

55

15.6

21

6.0

49

13.9

8

2.3

13

3.7

JME

49

31.8

32

20.8

31

20.1

18

11.7

9

5.9

8

5.2

7

4.5

JMM

21

43.8

9

18.8

12

25.0

4

8.3

1

2.1

1

2.1

—-

—

JMR

399

60.5

36

5.5

45

6.8

48

7.3

90

13.6

18

2.7

24

3.6

JR

164

60.3

12

4.4

34

12.5

21

7.7

34

12.5

4

1.5

3

1.1

ML

75

49.3

10

6.6

32

21.1

18

11.8

11

7.2

6

3.9

—

—

MS

57

50.9

6

5.4

5

4.5

11

9.8

22

19.6

6

5.4

5

4.5

1,660

54.9

254

8.4

367

12.1

246

8.1

346

11.5

69

2.3

79

2.6

Totals

FOOTNOTES
1

For a fuller account of these distinctions see Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Vitouch (2004),

Goodman (1993), Royall (1997), and especially Hubbard and Bayarri (2003).
2

With three exceptions, the dates in parentheses are the initial year the journal was published. It

was not possible to locate the first four years of the EJM (then known as the British Journal of
Marketing), nor the first seven years of the IJMR (until recently the Journal of the Market
Research Society). Given the nature of the data being collected in the study, it was unnecessary
to go back prior to 1960 for the JR. Also, data for the EJM and the IJMR extend only through
2000.

